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The optimal allocation of water along a system 









This paper uses a control theory approach to analyse the collectively optimal rate of
extraction along a river system and constructs a bidding mechanism that would pro-
duce the required prices at each point. It also analyses some characteristics of this
mechanism. This approach brings some new perspective to existing work on external-
ities. It also helps bring to light some aspects of the system as a whole that may be less
obvious in a more piecemeal analysis, including the fact that there may not be an opti-
mal solution to the allocation problem. Although the bidding mechanism may be dif-










Social planners and policy-makers increasingly have to make decisions about
the optimal allocation of water from an interconnected system of rivers in
which demand exceeds supply. This raises questions about the calculation of
the collectively optimal rate of extraction at each point. It also raises ques-
tions about whether the optimal program can be implemented. The problem
here is that the information on pay-off functions required by a centralised
distribution mechanism may not be available. If so, is it possible to design a
decentralised mechanism that produces the correct price for water at every
point? This paper deals with some of these questions.
The solution to the problem of allocating water that has received most
attention is to provide individuals with rights, or a permit, to a speciﬁed amount
of water and allow trading in these rights (Burness and Quirk 1979; Kanazawa
1991; Quiggin 2001; Weber 2001; Ambec and Spumont 2002; Anderson 2004).
The problem here is that a river is a unidirectional ﬂow and an agent higher in
the order may inﬂict costs on an agent lower in the order by removing or polluting
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water. This means that the optimal price cannot, in general, be uniform and
that wherever there are externalities any trading scheme must support a set of
location-speciﬁc prices that shadow the collectively optimal price. An appro-
priate price could always, in principle, be achieved if a sufﬁciently complete
set of rights could be allocated to all users at every point along the river, but
this raises serious, and probably insuperable, transaction costs. The alternative
is to design some sort of tradeable permits scheme that would generate the
optimal price. This problem has received considerable attention in the literature
and more recently there have been attempts to design trading mechanisms
that takes the ﬂow properties of a river into account (Weber 2001). As will
be shown below, however, there is still some way to go in the design of a satis-
factory pricing mechanism.
The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll some of these gaps by analysing the
collectively optimal rate of extraction along a river system in a control theory
framework and constructing a bidding mechanism that would produce the
required prices at each point. It also analyses some characteristics of this
mechanism.
The control theory approach used in this paper is also intended to provide
a simple way of looking at the problem as a whole that differs from that
available in much of the literature, and gives some fresh insights into existing
results on externalities. The results of the optimal control approach could, in
principle, be established in the more familiar discrete framework, such as that
used in Weber (2001) and Kilgour and Dinar (2001). Nonetheless it has the
advantage of extending the toolkit available for policy-makers and analysts.
It may also help bring to light some aspects of the system that may be less
obvious in a more piecemeal analysis. One of these is that there may not be
an optimal solution to the maximising problem under all conditions. This
may impose a serious constraint on optimal allocation. The result is easy to
see, although something of a surprise.
The approach in this paper also differs from recent work in cooperative
game theory. This takes advantage of the fact that, because water ﬂows
continuously, coalitions must be connected and hence the pay-off available
to a player depends on its marginal value (Moulin 1995, p. 407; Ambec and
Spumont 2002). This does not tell us anything about collective optimal rates
of extraction.
Among the main ﬁndings are that, although it is possible to design a mech-
anism that guarantees the optimum price at each point, this may be difﬁcult
to implement if there are a large number of extracting agents or environmental
interests are endogenised in the pay-off function. On the other hand it may
be possible to design various forms of hybrid schemes that take over part
of the suggested mechanism and allow partial avoidance of information and
optimal pricing problems.




2 a simple model of water alloca-




3 I show that markets for rights
cannot meet the conditions required for an optimal allocation. 
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2. The model of a river system
2.1 The general model of optimal extraction
 
Suppose there is a waterway, thought of as a set of connected rivers that ﬂow
continuously over their entire length, and a planner wishes to determine the
collectively optimal volume of water to be extracted at every point. This col-
lectively optimal volume is understood as the volume that maximises a col-
lective welfare function. It is assumed that the welfare function is additive
and depends on the pay-offs to different users as well as constraints that
reﬂect the concerns of the community over such things as minimum water
levels and limitations to rates of extraction. It is assumed that each river col-
lects, or loses, water as the result of rain, evaporation, tributaries, branches
and so on along its way. These gains or losses are represented in a continuous
manner. Any continuous path that terminates at the sea, or in a lake, or marsh,
or wherever, and any path that terminates on another path are thought of as






















 be single path
that does not commence from or terminate on another river in the system. It
does no harm to think of this as the main river in the system, but this need not













), and a river that begins on another river but does not end on a river






). Rivers that begin and end on other rivers are not
investigated; see Figure 1 for an example.
The rate of ﬂow in a river does not matter for present purposes, provided that
the water available at any point on the system partly depends on the water at the
previous point. The analysis does not hold for a lake. Nor does it hold for a system
where water extracted at some point is compensated for by an inﬂow from down-
stream, such as a slow-ﬂowing river opening into the sea. In this case extraction
of water at some point may cause an inﬂow of sea water to downstream points.
For simplicity we are only interested in a situation where the stand-alone
demands of each user for water impose negative externalities on other users
or the community. Floods and other situations where it might be desirable to
reduce the level of the river are ignored.























[0, 1]. The change in the
volume of water depends on natural gains and losses and the amount extracted.






























































  has some non-zero measure. These intervals can be






. In order to simplify the presentation it
is assumed that the partition is sufﬁciently ﬁne that the step function repre-
senting extraction in each interval can be approximated as closely as we like
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gives us the advantage of being able to treat the problem in continuous terms.
It involves no loss of generality since the properties of the discrete and the
continuous system will be the same (Whittle 1996, p. 132). Now for the details.

























































































The pay-off to an agent from extracting water depends on quantity extracted




 along the river. The pay-



























































For simplicity the volume of water in the river is used as a rough proxy for
quality and I do not deal explicitly with pollution discharges and return ﬂows.
Although this is only intended as a ﬁrst approximation it can be justiﬁed in a
number of ways. Return ﬂows can be eliminated with suitable rescaling, for
example, and where these carry back pollution this can be treated as a reduc-
tion in the available water. In addition pollution from efﬂuent discharge depends
on the amount of water used and on the amount of water in the river, and
can also be treated as a function of volume.
It is also reasonable to assume that there are agents that derive a pay-off from
the water left in-stream at any point. Examples here would be environmentalist
and conservation interests and people who use the river for ﬁshing and boating.
It is important to note that environmental interests make a claim to the resource
at the same point as the claim made by the extractive agent at every point. The
claims of the two types of agents might be thought of as parallel, or simultane-
ous, rather than being in sequence along a river. This does not create problems
for the optimisation problem but will create problems for us in designing a




































. In many cases,
of course the environmental interest will not directly purchase permits and
the environmental pay-off is thought of as a function of the water in the river.
There may also be conditions on the amount that can be extracted at any
point, such as a lower bound on the amount of water that must be left, or an
upper bound on the proportion of the available water that can be taken out.
Figure 1 Example of a river system. 
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I do not deal with these in this paper, although the framework used here can
be extended to take these, and other types of constraint, into account.
In addition to such constraints, a scrap value might be attributed to the
water left at the terminal point of a river that drains into the ocean or a lake.
Apart from environmental reasons, the water may have commercial value for
holiday resorts, or for a ﬁshing industry or for some other users not strictly
on the river. Alternatively the river may cross a political border and the scrap
value will represent its worth to the next country or political jurisdiction. The




2, . . . , ψ
n} where ψ
i is the scrap value
attached to σ
i. This is simpliﬁed by letting ψ
i = k
ix(1)
i. I show in Theorem 1
that only one scrap value can be imposed from the outset but leave the prob-
lem in general form for the time being.
The planner’s problem for the continuous system can now be written
(2)
subject to the dynamics of the system in Equation (1) where δ
i = 1 if the scrap
value is imposed and δ
i = 0 otherwise.
2.2 Reduction to a single river with a single speciﬁed scrap value
The analysis of the system can be simpliﬁed by noting that it can be separ-
ated into its components under certain conditions and these components are
similar in a formal sense. A river σ
j that terminates at a point tk on σ
k is similar
to σ
k if it can be analysed in the same way as σ
k by assigning a scrap value to
the water at its terminal point equivalent to the value of the water in σ
k at tk.
A river σ
j that commences at tk on σ
k is similar to σ
k if it can be analysed by
assigning a value to its initial point equivalent to the value of the water in σ
k
at tk. We might think of analysing σ
1 ﬁrst, for example, and using this analysis
to determine the appropriate scrap values or starting values to provide the correct
program for each branching river. Although this is intuitively plausible from
the structure of the problem in Equation (2), it needs to be stated precisely
and established and I do this in Theorem 1.
An interesting characteristic of the system is that there may not always be
a solution to the problem of ﬁnding a collectively optimal allocation at each
point if the initial speciﬁcation of the problem attaches a scrap value to more
than one river. Call this an original scrap value to distinguish it from the scrap
values that need to be assigned as part of the solution. This follows directly
from the nature of the optimal control problem. If an initial value and an
original scrap value are attached to the same system, the solution must satisfy
a differential equation with two end-points. This is, in general, impossible.
Theorem 1. (a) The problem in Equation (2) has a unique solution and the for-
mal properties of each σ
i are similar if only one original scrap value is speciﬁed
maxJf g d t k x
i
n
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for the system. (b) If more than one original scrap value is speciﬁed the optimal
solution may fail to exist.
Proof: See Appendix I.
From a practical point of view part (b) is unwelcome news and may impose
serious limitations on any attempt to design a policy that gives a collectively
optimal result. An analysis of the conditions under which this problem might
be avoided is beyond the scope of the present paper.
It follows from part (a) that we can concentrate on the single river σ
1 and
I do this in what follows. To simplify the notation I refer to this as the river
and drop the superscripts.
2.3 Necessary conditions
The collectively optimal amount of water will be extracted at each point only
if the system speciﬁed in Equations (1) and (2) satisfy the conditions given by





where v is a candidate path and u is the optimal path. α is the costate variable
and can be thought of as giving the value of the water under the optimal program
at each instant. This is important for our purposes because it amounts to
saying that, in a decentralised decision-making mechanism, every agent at point
t should use water up to the point that marginal return equals the marginal
value determined by α. Solving Equation 4 gives
(5)
and we can think of the optimal price as p(t) = α(t) where p(t) is the price at t.
It should be noted that the environmental interest only enters into the
optimal program through its affect on α in Equation 4. This is because the
environmental interest does not extract water from the river and does not
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amount extracted. As the marginal value of water to the environmental inter-
est increases ∂g/∂x and hence α increases at each point and less is extracted
at the equilibrium price.
As observed in Section 1, this still leaves the optimal allocation undetermined
because the values of f and g are not necessarily known to the planner at each t.
I now consider the problem of designing a mechanism that will produce the
optimal price at each point.
3. The mechanism design problem
The mechanism that induces each agent to pay the correct price at every point
on the river needs to capture the fact that damage from extraction affects a
smaller number of users as extraction moves downstream. It is intuitively
obvious that the price of water in the optimal program should also decrease.
This is conﬁrmed by noting that !(t) < 0 from Equation 4. It also seems obvi-
ous that a direct auction, or an open market, for permits, must fail to be
optimal as this cannot guarantee that the amount of damage by upstream
users to downstream users is reﬂected in the price at each point. Although
this is consistent with what we know about markets and auctions with exter-
nalities it cannot simply be asserted. I provide the proofs in Appendix II.
It follows from this that the design problem might be solved if it is possible
for an agent at s to prevent an agent at s − ε buying rights too cheaply where
a price is considered too cheap if it does not build in the cost of consumption
at s − ε to the downstream agent. I will sometimes refer to an agent at s as s
to avoid repetition.
In what follows I consider variants of a permit trading scheme that has this
characteristic. The permit to extract held at the point t = s might be speciﬁed
in a number of ways. For simplicity it is assumed that what is being bought
is the permission to extract some amount of water at a point t and this is re-
written w(t). This means that the extraction plan by any agent in an interval
around t would have to satisfy w(t) ≥ u(t) in the interval around t.
In order to simplify I ignore environmental interests and concentrate on
the pay-off function in Equation (2) rewritten  . I reintroduce environ-
mental interests near the end of this section.
3.1 Market with extraction and blocking strategies
The possibility of a market with a direct blocking strategy that satisﬁes the
conditions set out above has been considered in some recent work by Weber
(2001). Weber claims that such a strategy will be effective and trade will only
take place between adjacent users. Is this correct?
The market considered is one in which the planner distributes permits
along the river and these can be traded in a Walrasian pure exchange market
in which buying and selling can take place between any two points on the
river. There is perfect information and offers to buy are made at no cost.
Jf k       =+  0
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Roughly, the idea behind a direct blocking strategy in this market is that if
an agent immediately upstream tries to buy permits, then it pays a down-
stream agent to match the offer since extraction by the upstream agent will
do some damage. This matching will continue until the price is such that the
marginal damage to the downstream agent and the marginal beneﬁt to the
upstream agent are in equilibrium. This is stated more precisely by deﬁning a
blocking strategy for an agent at s as an offer to match any offer by an agent
at s – ε for rights from t > s. Remember that the river ﬂows from 0 to 1 and
s – ε is upstream from s. Write this strategy ϑs. If this strategy is credible there
is an equilibrium in which s – ε does not attempt to buy from a downstream
player. Write this ϑs–ε.
For these strategies to work the threat to match an offer must be credible
in that if an agent’s threat to buy were called they would actually use the
threatened strategy. Such a strategy is called subgame perfect in the game
theoretical literature. A subgame perfect equilibrium comprises strategies
that would be optimal if the subgame were played. I now show that the direct
blocking scheme fails this test.
Theorem 2. There is some f and s ∈ (0, 1) such that (ϑs–ε, ϑs) is not a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Appendix III.
It follows that the direct blocking strategy cannot prevent purchases taking
place between non-adjacent users unless they are prohibited. In addition we
get the following easy corollary of Theorem 2, which will prove useful later.
Deﬁne a sequential market as one in which the ﬁnal price at s depends only
on offers made by a single agent at s and the agent directly above or below.
The exact nature of the dependence does not matter.
Corollary 1 of Theorem 2. A market mechanism is optimal only if it is sequential.
Proof: Suppose a market is not sequential. If the price at s depends on
offers by a non-adjacent agent it is not optimal from the proof of Theorem
2. If there is more than one agent at s neither has an incentive to offer a price
that takes into account the full marginal cost of consumption at s – ε.
It is possible to put the last part of the proof slightly differently. Where
there are two different types of agents competing for permits in the same
interval the externalities will not be internalised but the optimal price
requires that externalities are taken into account at every point.
I now consider a mechanism which produces the optimal price.
3.2 The sequential bidding game with extraction
The sequential bidding game overcomes problems in the blocking strategy by
forcing agents to bid for permits in sequence and allowing for re-contractingOptimal allocation of water along a river 321
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by a downstream agent if an upstream agent bids too low. This gives the
downstream agent an effective means of making its interest effective in the
market. In addition there is a penalty attached to any revealed mis-statement
by an upstream agent to prevent an upstream agent exhausting the capacity
of a downstream agent to re-contract. This game has a Nash equilibrium in
which the optimum price is paid at each point. Since this scheme works for
any river with a terminal value for water, from Theorem 1 it works for all ter-
minating rivers. In the case of a commencing river the initial value of the
water is speciﬁed and the scheme will work in these cases by substituting
s ≡ 1 − t and running the sequence backward from the initial point.
Under this mechanism buying and selling by agents after the initial alloca-
tion of permits is not allowed since, as already shown, this would violate the
optimal price. This leaves the problem of how to handle the fact that pay-off
functions might change over time. One way in which we might take care of this
is to make the permits time-dependent and re-auction them on a regular basis.
This mechanism is speciﬁed as follows and the general idea is illustrated in
Figure 2. An agent at s has perfect knowledge of f in some interval around s
greater than B(s; 2ε). The planner can levy a penalty π ≥ 0.
Stage 1. Starting at s = 1, s nominates an amount w(s) to be bought at the
price p(s) = α(1) = k.
Stage 2. s – ε nominates p(s – ε) and w(s – ε).
Stage 3. s can either: (a) take no action or (b) return a portion w(s)/b for b > 1
of its rights and purchase w(s)/b at   for some
arbitrarily small γ > 0 from s − ε.
Stage 4. If (a) s – 2ε bids and s − ε can either return w(s − ε)/b of its rights and
purchase from s − 2ε or take no action.
If (b) a penalty π is levied on s − ε and it is required to return all unsold
rights and nominate a new price p(s − ε) and w(s − ε).
Stage 5. s can either: (a) take no action or (b) return a portion (w(s)/b)
(1−1/b) of its rights and purchase from the player at s − ε at p(s − ε)
Stage 6. If (a) proceed as in Stage 5 (a).
If (b) proceed as in 4 (b).
Stage n. s ∈[0, ε) bids and s = ε holds.
Theorem 3. The sequential bidding game has an equilibrium at the optimal
price for π ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix IV.
3.3 Environmental interests in the sequential bidding game
The sequential bidding game can easily be extended to other constraints
such as a lower bound on the amount to be extracted at each point, provided
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we are able to mimic this constraint with a scrap value function. A more
difﬁcult question is, what happens if we drop the simpliﬁcation and restore
pay-offs to environmental or recreational interests given by the function g in
Equation (2)?
The sequential bidding game cannot, in general, produce an optimal result
in this case. Where environmental interests are not represented in the market
this is obvious because they will not be taken into account by extractive
agents. To see this, note that the optimal price is now given by α(t) = k +
 from Equation (5) whereas only the ∂f/∂x term determines
the purchase price.
Where some representative of these interests stands in the market α will be
the same as in the previous paragraph and the environmental agent will want
to maximise a function of the form g(x, y, t).
The reason for the failure in this case was foreshadowed in Section 3. Environ-
mental interests can only be modelled by assuming there are two pay-off
functions at every point but according to Corollary 1 of Theorem 2 this
means that the price cannot be optimal, in general. What is happening, roughly,
is that because each type of agent optimises separately there is no guarantee
that identity p = α is maintained.
In order to show the details I demonstrate this formally in Appendix V.
This analysis could be extended to cover other cases where the pay-off function
for environmental interests is endogenous to the optimisation problem.
3.4 Remarks on environmental interests
It is not at all clear how these problems might be overcome in any scheme in
which the pay-off function of the environmental interest is endogenous to the
function to be maximised. It would not be possible to avoid them by altering
the bidding mechanism because the sequence of purchases required to attain
the correct price is lost.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to use a control theory approach to
develop a model of the optimal allocation of water along a system of rivers
and to explore the implications of this model for the design of permit bidding
systems. Although the results of the continuous approach can also be obtained
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in a discrete model, the continuous model may have some general value in
adding to the tools available for looking at externalities in systems of rivers.
It is also capable of extension in a number of directions such as adding con-
straints on the amount, or proportion, of water that can be extracted at each
point.
The use of a continuous ﬂow approach to an entire river system also
revealed some interesting features of the optimisation problem. Perhaps the
most important of these was that this problem may not have a solution if a
value is placed on water at more than one terminal point. It was also shown that
auctions cannot give the optimal allocation of water and that markets for
rights have an empty core. This is consistent with the more familiar literature
on externalities.
It was also shown that it is possible to solve the problem of an optimal
price at each point with a sequential bidding mechanism. This mechanism is
likely to fail, however, if an attempt is made to optimise a pay-off function
that endogenises environmental considerations.
One way in which the environmental problem might be avoided is to treat
environmental interests as side constraints. In this case it would be possible
to calculate the optimal amount of water to be withheld before bidding, or to
lump all environmental interests into a terminal value on a single river. This
would give some sort of hybrid scheme in which collective interests in the
environment are estimated by a public body and then water permits are marketed.
It should also be noted that the sequential bidding mechanism could be
difﬁcult to implement if there is a large number of players. If the number of
players is small, however, or individual extractors could be aggregated and
represented by a manager, the scheme may be workable.
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Appendix I. Proof of Theorem 1
(a)F r om the necessary conditions α
1 is uniquely deﬁned for any river.
(i). σ
j terminating. Let t
1 be the point of termination on σ
1 and write





2(1)) to ensure that the value of the water at
the termination point of σ




i is the right hand side of (1). Differentiating and cancelling gives
∂J
1/(∂x
1(t1)) = −α1(t1) and ∂J
2/(∂x
2(1)) = −α2(1). From the transversality con-
ditions α2(1) = ∂ψ
2/∂x2 where ψ
2 is the scrap value assigned to σ
2. This
means that the condition is met by choosing an appropriate ψ
2.
(b)C onsider, for example, the case where J =   (u + x) and x = a − u with α(0) =
1 and α(1) = 3. In this case ! = 1 and cannot satisfy the end states. It might
be thought that this depends on that fact that ! is not a function of u or x.
Consider J =   2√ux. In this case α = √u/x to give α = α(0)√2t. This will not
satisfy an arbitrary α(1).
Appendix II. Direct auctions and markets for rights
Direct auction
The planner puts some ﬁxed amount of permits on sale, equivalent to the total
volume of water in the river, and these are sold in public bidding tournament
in which a permit goes to the highest bidder.
Proposition 1. The direct auction does not, in general, produce a price func-
tion that solves the allocation problem.
Proof: The volume of water available at t = s depends on the amount used
in t < s and hence x = x(p(t)). In this case the problem at t = s is to choose
u(s) and w(s) to maximise
F(s, x(p), u) + γ(w(p) – u) − pw(p) (6)
where γ is the multiplier on the inequality constraint. This is done by setting
u = w and
Jf ghx x x
ii i i i
ii
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In addition it must be the case that p = α in order to get the optimal level
of extraction. Since this gives a system of three equations with two unknowns
it is not, in general, consistent.
Unrestricted market for rights
The planner distributes all rights along the river and these can be traded in a
Walrasian pure exchange market in which buying and selling can take place
between any two points on the river. There is perfect information, offers to buy
are made at no cost and are for rights to be used at the point making the offer.
It is a direct corollary of Proposition 1 that a market cannot provide a solution
that satisﬁes the optimisation program since the problem is essentially that of
Equation (6). In addition it is easy to prove the following stronger theorem.
Proposition 2. The unrestricted market for rights has an empty core.
Proof: Suppose p = p(t) is an imputation in the core that offers the same
price at all t. Then an individual in an interval around t = s can do better by
offering a price p < q < p +   to the individual in the interval around
s − ε. This is because   represents the damage done at s by consumption
in the interval s − ε where the integral form comes from the continuity of f.
Now consider an imputation where p(t) ≠ p(s) for all s, t ∈ [0, 1]. This gives
two cases.
(i). p(t) is not decreasing as t increases. An individual at s can do better by
buying from s – δ at p(s – δ).
(ii). p(t) is decreasing as t increases as required in the optimisation program.
It follows that, if the price between points (s, s + ε) does not decrease by
 there is an incentive to trade. If the price decreases by 
then s does better by buying rights from s + δ for some δ > ε at a price  p(s + δ)
+   < p(s + δ) +   = p(s + ε) +   = p(s).
Appendix III. Proof of Theorem 2
The only case of interest is where p(t) decreases as t increases. Consider adjacent
points s − ε and s and suppose that ϑs is subgame perfect. Because it pays
s − ε to offer any amount in the range [0, p(s − ε)) to s + δ for δ > 0, s can only
implement ϑs by buying the right at p(s − ε). The fact that (s − ε) can repeat
this for all t > s means that s must buy all rights held by t > s. Let the cost to
s of allowing the purchase by (s − ε) be c1, of holding   rights be c2, and
selling on to t > s at p(t) < p(s − ε) be c3. Then there is some f and s such that
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Appendix IV. Proof of Theorem 3
This theorem is proven with the help of the following Lemma which also
throws some light on the information problem. Write the optimal allocation
as w*.
Lemma 1. If w = w* and trades can only take place between adjacent agents
p(t) = α(t).
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider three agents at s – ε, s and s + ε written a, b
and c for convenience. Write the purchase price of a right by z from a as .  The
marginal value of a purchase by b from a is .
The marginal value of a purchase from c is  . If the market
is in equilibrium there are no gains from trade and hence 
. This means  . The price paid by the
agent at s ∈ (1 − ε, 1) is p(s) = k = α(1). It follows that the price to s − ε is
. This gives p(t) = α(t) by induction.
Note that, because α(1) is known, s ∈ (1 – ε, 1] and s – ε have sufﬁcient
information to bid p(t) = α(t).
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose s ∈ (1 − ε, 1] and the agent at s − ε bids p(s − ε)
< α(s − ε). It is optimal for s to buy w(s)/b at 
 for γ sufﬁciently small. For some π ≥ 0 we have
vs–ε p(1 − ε) < vs–εα(s − ε) and s − ε bids α(s − ε). The rest of the proof follows
by induction.
Appendix V. Demonstration for environmental agents
In the case where both types of agents purchase, each type solves its optimisation
problem separately. Consider the agent around t = 1. Since the extractive agent only
takes account of the payoff to f we know from Equation (5) that  .
For the environmental agent the solution is   since  .
From the fact that there can only be one price at a point the solution is
given by the pair (p(t), w(t)):     in
general. From Equation (5) this means that p ≠ α, in general, as required.
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